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Abstract 
 
Initially hailed as a miracle crop for biofuel production, Jatropha has recently attracted 
criticism for competing with food production, causing adverse biodiversity impacts, and 
jeopardizing land access by rural populations in tropical countries. This paper analyzes the 
contested development of Jatropha biofuel sector in Tanzania by anchoring two new concepts 
of ‘organizational models’ and ‘institutional arrangements’ to the sectoral systems of 
innovation perspective. The notion of ‘organizational models’ brings into relief the 
heterogeneity of actors in an innovation system and the ways in which the actors form 
networks, within and across national borders, to organize innovative activities. The concept of 
‘institutional arrangements’ refers to the ensemble of formal and informal institutions 
assembled during Tanzania’s colonial and post-colonial eras, which directly govern 
innovative activities in specific organizational models. Based on a location-specific and 
historically-grounded institutional analysis within the innovation system framework, 
implications are drawn for the future development of Tanzania’s Jatropha sector including its 
links with European markets and for the regulation of ‘next-generation’ biofuels. 
  
(164 words) 
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1. Introduction 
In the early years of the new millennium, Jatropha emerged as an important biofuel crop in 
many tropical countries. Initially hailed as a wonder crop (e.g., Francis et al., 2005), it soon 
became subject to severe criticism, along with many other biofuel crops, for competing with 
food production, causing adverse biodiversity impacts, jeopardizing land access by local 
populations, and fostering exploitative conditions of employment on large plantations (Achten 
et al., 2007; Friends of the Earth, 2010). In less than a decade, the development of Jatropha 
biofuels had turned into a highly chaotic mix of contestations and complex non-linear learning 
trajectories, replete with contradictions between global, national and local developments, as 
well as confrontations between elites and the rural poor.  
In this paper we examine how this process has played out in the incipient sectoral 
system of innovation (SSI) developing in Tanzania, an important forerunner in Jatropha 
biofuel production, whose experiences have informed the international debate to a 
considerable extent. Our main objective is to perform an historical-institutional analysis of 
emergent organizational dynamics underlying the turbulent development of a sector around 
this controversial new technology. While recent studies have explored the development of 
contestations and conflict around biofuel sustainability in Tanzania and beyond (see for 
example, McCarthy et al., 2012; Montefrio, 2012; Romijn and Caniëls, 2011; Levidow and 
Paul, 2010), they have not studied how the emergence of biofuel sectors is shaped by long-
standing historical institutions that are updated to present times in a co-evolutionary process 
of simultaneous mutual shaping of the old and the new. Such an analysis of emergence of new 
sector emergence is perhaps best carried out using the sectoral systems of innovation 
framework. However, in order to provide historical-institutional depth to the analysis of the 
emergence and early development of the complex and contested Jatropha biofuel sector in 
Tanzania, we have augmented the conventional SSI with two new concepts.  
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Using middle-range theorizing that starts from a specific empirical and historical 
situation, we develop the concepts of ‘institutional arrangements’ and ‘organizational 
models’. These concepts allow us to historicize institutions such as rules, beliefs and durable 
relations of power, which shape the activities of and the interactions between different actors 
in a sectoral system of innovation. Moreover, by including actors such as non-governmental 
development organizations and mass media outlets in our analysis, we are able to broaden the 
range of actors, their networks and interactive learning processes, which are normally 
considered as constituent elements of an innovation system. As we will show in this article, 
historically-constituted institutional arrangements directly govern the emergence of different 
organizational models and shape the interactions between (for- and non-profit) organizations, 
peasants and the state in these models, which form the core of Tanzania’s Jatropha biofuels 
sector. Paying attention to governance by institutions that are specific to Tanzania allows us to 
reveal how ostensibly global developments, such as the demand for biofuels induced by the 
climate change imperative and its European subsidies/targets, are ‘localized’ in different 
organizational models. Such location-specific and historically-grounded explanations of 
sectoral development processes are difficult to arrive through analyses that apply a ‘universal’ 
conceptual framework, such as the conventional SSI, in a particular part of the world.  
Through this augmented SSI analysis, we aim to accomplish two things. First, we aim to 
trigger further conceptual development within the domain of innovation system studies. This 
conceptual development, as we illustrate below, should be driven by specific local histories 
rather than by treating prevailing institutions in a region or sector as local manifestations of 
generalist institutional elements of a SSI. Second, our historical-institutional and 
organizational analysis permits the drawing of policy implications for benefits (if any) and 
risks associated with Jatropha biofuel development in Tanzania (and its role as a supplier of 
biofuel feedstock for European consumption) and so-called ‘next-generation’ biofuels. 
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Policies to adequately regulate biofuel innovation and production have become particularly 
urgent in developing country contexts, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, where many 
biofuel investments have unleashed a large-scale grab of natural resources out of the hands of 
the rural poor in the hallowed name of global environmental sustainability   
This article draws on two surveys conducted among biofuel actors in Tanzania in 2005 
and 2008/9. More recent material collected during 2011-2 was used to update some of the 
arguments. In section 2, we introduce the SSI framework and then augment it by developing 
the two key theoretical concepts of organizational models and institutional arrangements. 
Section 3 outlines the data collection methodology. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis, 
organised into three distinct periods. Section 5 presents summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Governance of organizational models in sectoral systems of innovation 
The sectoral systems of innovation (SSI) literature conceives of sectors as composed of actors 
and their networks, which are governed by a variety of formal and informal institutions 
(Malerba and Mani, 2009a). The central idea is that actor diversity, cooperative as well as 
competitive relationships between them, and innovation-conducive institutions such as policy 
incentives and trust promotes economic growth, technological dynamism and competitiveness 
(Metcalfe, 1995). 
The sectoral innovation systems framework has been commonly used to analyse the 
emergence and development of new sectors as a process in which firms attempt to create and 
exploit the economic potential of technological innovations by meeting an emerging demand 
for new and established products (Malerba, 2002). In carrying out their sector-building 
activities, firms interact with a heterogeneous group of other actors (suppliers, users, 
universities, government organizations etc.) to form networks and learn technologically to 
develop not only new (or improved) products but also more suitable production technologies. 
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The effectiveness of this learning by interacting is shaped, and the different network 
relationships are governed, by national as well as sector-specific institutions. The governing 
institutions include ‘formal’ laws (e.g. intellectual property rights, environmental regulations) 
and standards (on industrial safety, quality etc.) as well as ‘informal’ beliefs, routines and 
social norms in specific regions and communities (Malerba and Mani, 2009a). Such a sectoral 
system is however not static but rather its different elements, ranging from new technologies 
to networked organizations and governing institutions, co-evolve with each other (Malerba, 
2002).  
In recent years, the sectoral systems of innovation (SSI) framework has been used to 
study innovation processes and emergence of new sectors in developing economies (see e.g. 
Chaturvedi, 2007; Kristinsson and Rao, 2008; Kim and Lee, 2008; Malerba and Mani, 2009b; 
Cusmano et al., 2010). This literature has provided rich insights into the acquisition of 
innovation capabilities among developing country firms in sectors ranging from wine in Chile 
to wind energy in India and capital goods in Korea. The process of technological ‘catch-up’ 
has been shown to be driven not only through learning linkages with advanced economy 
sources of knowledge but also through firms’ networking with domestic organizations such as 
research institutes and universities. Despite its rich insights however, this literature has tended 
to focus on ‘mainstream’ innovation actors (firms, scientific institutions, R&D labs, public 
policy makers), leading to a relative neglect of ‘fringe’ actors such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), citizens’ pressure groups, mass media and resource-poor peasants (cf. 
Hart and Sharma, 2004). These ‘fringe’ actors may play a crucial role in the evolution of a 
new sector, particularly under the aegis of international development. 
Additionally, the literature has generally under-appreciated the importance of specificity 
and the complexity of new sector emergence in developing country contexts. Far from being a 
teleological process, the development of new sectors in most settings is likely to be a 
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disorderly mix of local-global contradictions, contestations and non-linear learning 
trajectories.1  
Controversies around new technologies and the contested sectoral development process 
triggered by them thus necessitates us to move beyond a conventional systems of innovation 
approach as frequently employed by SSI scholars. In order to study the organizational and 
institutional emergence of a rather controversial new sector (biofuels) in Tanzania’s 
globalized yet specific postcolonial context, we augment the SSI framework with two new 
concepts. First, to account for the full diversity of actors and the ways in which they form 
relationships with other actors and organize innovative activities, we develop the notion of 
organizational models. Focussing on organisational models draws attention to actors hitherto 
not considered as part of the SSI. These ‘fringe’ actors do not only shape learning by firms, 
research institutes and government, they may also learn themselves about the underlying 
knowledge bases and wider socio-economic consequences of new technologies. Additionally, 
studying the emergence of organizational models foregrounds how different actors become 
organisationally bound together in complete value chains. Second, in order to carry out a 
more explicit historical-institutional analysis of the governance of (the emergence and 
evolution of) different organizational models, we introduce the concept of institutional 
arrangement composed of multiple formal and informal institutions formed during successive 
                                                
1 Such an under-appreciation of contestations is perhaps due to the SSI framework’s underlying theoretical view on 
how learning networks emerge. Differences in competences among the actors making up a SSI are argued to underlie 
network emergence which allows firms to “integrate complementarities in knowledge, capabilities and specialization” 
(Malerba, 2002: 256). While we agree with the SSI’s thrust on heterogeneity of actors in terms of their competence 
and objectives, harnessing this difference solely for integrative complementary learning forecloses possibilities of 
observing and analyzing contestations between actors. Actors may arrive at divergent understandings of an 
innovation based on their different knowledge bases, competence and objectives. In fact, whether differences 
between actors will converge toward complementarity or diverge toward contestation can only be known ex-post 
and fruitfully analyzed as a process that is shaped by historically-constituted institutions.   
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eras of Tanzania’s colonial and post-colonial history. In this conceptualization, Tanzanian 
institutional factors are not treated as local manifestations of generalist national or sectoral 
institutional elements of an innovation system which can be found anywhere in the world. 
Rather we attempt what may be called middle-range theorizing (Boudon, 1991; Geels, 2007), 
driven by a specific empirical situation and history, in order to embed the emergence of 
Tanzania’s biofuel sector explicitly within its postcolonial context. However this does not 
imply that we treat the Tanzanian SSI as self-contained, lacking any connections to the 
outside world. 
 
Organizational models  
In the current era of globalization, few if any sectors are developed within the confines of 
national borders. This is particularly true for countries where international development funds 
flow in at the same time as foreign direct investments by transnational corporations. 
Therefore, to study sectoral emergence and development, we must consider the dynamics of 
global connections alongside local activities and processes. This implies going beyond 
accounting for trade and investment flows by studying how actors in particular socio-
economic settings assimilate and adapt global developments such as changes in international 
regulatory frameworks and the advent of new external sources of knowledge or grassroots 
initiatives by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in response to calls for bottom-up 
development from international aid agencies. To study the changing (heterogeneous) 
composition and activities of an emerging network of actors in a sector, including their local 
and non-local ties, we propose the notion of organizational models. An organisational model 
refers to the way in which production, innovation and use of a particular product or 
technology is carried out in the emerging sector. The concept combines and connects two of 
three building blocks of a sectoral system of innovation, knowledge/technology and 
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actors/networks.2 It brings into focus the formation of networks and value chains (including 
the content of flows between actors in the networks or chains), which may be required to 
create, produce and use a technology in a sectoral system of innovation. These networks and 
value chains may be composed of profit-making entities such as firms and/or non-profit 
organizations, which may collectively organize and perform the entire range of activities from 
cultivation to end-use (in our case, of Jatropha biofuels).  
Our concept of organizational model is related to the better known term of ‘business 
model’ which has become common currency in recent strategic management literature (see 
for example, Amit and Zott, 2001; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Teece, 2010). A large 
number of definitions of the business model concept are now available. Based on a survey of 
the literature, Zott et al. (2011a) argue that ‘business model’ is not one, but rather many 
concepts. The dominant conceptualisation views a business model as the logic of how a 
business creates value while meeting its customers’ needs and “the architecture of revenues, 
costs, and profits associated with the business enterprise delivering that value [to its 
customers].” (Teece, 2010: 173; see also Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). Studies 
adopting such a definition of business model generally analyse how a focal firm exploits 
technological or organizational innovations (Zott et al., 2011a). Even though it is noted that a 
focal firm cannot create or exploit value without its suppliers and buyers, the business model 
concept remains centred on the firm and its revenue flows. Such a conceptualization is 
inadequate for appreciating the heterogeneity of actors and networks operating in Tanzania’s 
emerging Jatropha sector.  
A more promising conceptualization for our purposes is provided by studies on business 
strategy which lay emphasis on activities that cross a firm’s boundaries. Here, a business 
                                                
2 The third building block, institutions, is elaborated by the concept of institutional arrangement discussed later. 
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model is treated as an activity system.3 It is a “system that is made up of components, linkages 
and dynamics” (Afuah & Tucci, 2001: 4, in Zott et al., 2011a: 19). An activity system then 
tells us how a set of interdependent activities are organized by a network of actors. It includes 
the commercial/financial concepts used by the actors, their product and/or service offerings, 
the organisation of cultivation, production, distribution and (envisaged) end-use, development 
of new technologies, marketing concepts and buyer-supplier relationships. However, the 
activity systems (and the wider business model) literature has little to say about how a diverse 
group of actors form and modify relationships with each other in a network, governed by a set 
of relevant institutions in a sectoral system of innovation (SSI).  
In the Jatropha biofuels SSI of Tanzania, different organizational models have appeared in 
succession: the local rural community development model; the decentralised 
outgrower/subcontractor model; and the (large) plantation-based model. Ostensibly, these 
forms of business organisation constitute more or less generic models that are recognisable 
across countries and sectors, as is the trend over time from small community development 
projects towards large-scale commercial investments (Thurmond, 2007). However, a closer 
examination reveals how their development is guided by historical institutions that are 
specific to Tanzania’s postcolonial context and bear some resemblance to late colonial models 
of organising production and processing of agri-commodities (Havinden and Meredith, 1993). 
Each organizational model is also closely associated with different actors, network relations, 
organisational strategies, and different views on the importance of economic viability as 
compared to environmental and social sustainability. In this sense then, the concept of 
                                                
3 The original concept of, and the early literature, on activity systems focussed on the set of interdependent and 
complementary activities performed by a single firm (see Zott et al., 2011b for an overview). In the present article 
however, we view it as the system of interlinked activities that span a firm’s boundaries and must be performed by a 
network of actors.  
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organizational models directs our attention not only to the heterogeneity of actors in a SSI, but 
also to the multiple modalities of their networks, their collective strategies and the socio-
economic and environmental consequences of their innovative activities.  
Furthermore, a variety of formal and informal institutions mediate between different 
actors’ activities in the organisational models and the socio-economic and environmental 
sustainability performance that the models give rise to. However, as it is still too early to 
analyse the definitive outcomes of the organisational models, we focus on the process 
dynamics: how key actors’ innovation and production activities, and the nature of 
relationships between them, are governed and influenced by relevant institutional 
arrangements.  
 
The institutional arrangement 
Following Casson et al. (2009), we use the term institutions to refer to local customs, beliefs, 
and social norms, as well as broader sectoral, national and global institutions such as the 
political climate and routines of government organizations, international trade regulations and 
development aid regimes. This emphasis on a wide range of institutions shaping actors’ 
innovative activities and interactions runs through much of the literature on systems of 
innovation (see for example, Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Lundvall et al., 2002; Parto et 
al., 2005; Malerba and Mani, 2009a).4 In the present article, we view the set of formal and 
informal institutions, which guide the development of an organizational model, as an 
institutional arrangement. ‘Governance’, then, is performed by a historically-constituted 
                                                
4 However, it must be noted that the concept of institutions has taken different meanings in different strands of the 
systems of innovation literature (see Gronning, 2008 for a review). Some scholars have also treated organizations, 
including large firms and their sub-units, as institutions (e.g. Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Nelson and Rosenberg, 
1993; Niosi, 2002).  
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institutional arrangement that includes relevant formal and informal institutions and policies 
which together guide investment, production and innovation activities in the sector. An 
institutional arrangement, after it has been gradually assembled and stabilized through a 
historical process, may be location-specific but its constituent elements often have their roots 
in national/global regulations and local ‘traditions’. For instance, the Tanzanian institutional 
arrangement of interest to us has its roots in pre-colonial ‘traditions’ (adapted to ‘modern’ 
times) and colonial as well as post-colonial modernity. Thus, in this arrangement that governs 
present-day biofuel activities in Tanzania, (updated) ‘traditional’ institutions co-exist with 
other newer institutions put in place during colonial and post-colonial eras.  
In the making of an institutional arrangement, older institutions condition the emergence 
of newer ones, even if the latter may eventually displace the former. In this way, older and 
newer institutions are transformed in interaction, or co-evolve, with each other as elements of 
a dynamic system of innovation. The past (in terms of older institutions) is not simply 
forgotten and relegated to history but remains active and relevant in guiding human behaviour 
in the present (Shortland, 1998). In general, institutional change may be viewed as the 
production of more and more entanglements between old and new institutional elements, 
rather than a progressive and complete replacement of the old by the new (cf. Latour, 2000). 
In the following, we delve into East African colonial and post-colonial history to delineate the 
formation of an institutional arrangement that is directly relevant for our present purposes of 
analysing the evolution of Tanzania’s Jatropha biofuels SSI. 
In colonial times, Mamdani (1996: 287) has famously argued that the “state [in Sub-
Saharan Africa] was a two-tiered structure: peasants were governed by a constellation of 
ethnically defined Native Authorities in the local state and these authorities were in turn 
supervised by white officials deployed from a racial pinnacle at the center.” Under this 
indirect governance, peasants did not possess the rights of a citizen but rather remained 
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subjects of the colonial state. The colonial government also acted as a custodian of an all-
encompassing ‘tribal customary’ law, often expanding and distorting its meaning and scope, 
which was used to exercise force on uncooperative peasantry as well as govern local land and 
labour transactions. These transactions took place in a grey area between coercive force and 
the market. In the post-colonial era, according to Mamdani, this enmeshment of force and 
market, of customary authority and economic logics, continued to flourish as colonial 
legacies.  
Recent studies have argued that Mamdani’s idea of the bifurcated state, in which colonial 
authorities used the power of customary chiefs to ‘indirectly govern’ their subjects, is an 
accurate description of the colonial situation during the 1920s and 30s only (see for example, 
Cooper, 2005; Schneider, 2006, Burton and Jennings, 2007). During the late colonial era of 
the 1940s and 50s, the decades directly preceding decolonization, the colonial state made 
concerted attempts to discontinue its ‘indirect governance’. In order to develop the colonies, 
the state had replaced most ‘traditional’ local chiefs with ‘modern and progressive’ 
Tanzanians. The latter, as members of village and district development councils, acted under 
direct orders from the central colonial government. Local governance through village and 
district development councils was thus progressively fused with the central government since 
the 1940s.5 The local councils received development plans and orders from the central 
government on whom they were financially dependent (Pallotti, 2008).  The post-colonial 
state inherited this scheme of developmentalist governance in which state officials attempted 
to sideline ‘traditional’ authority. Similar marginalization of traditional chiefs continued in the 
                                                
5 This fusion however does not imply that postcolonial governance completely replaced ‘traditional’ social relations. 
Governance through networks of informal patron-client relationships were materialized, by patrons and clients both, 
throughout the post-colonial era (Young, 2004). 
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first two decades (1960s and 70s) of the post-colonial era, particularly in Nyerere’s socialist 
Tanzania.  
Developmentalism, embedded in shared visions (of progress) and routines of state 
officials at all levels,6 is believed to be the basis of authoritarian rule by late colonial and post-
colonial governments (see e.g. Scott’s 1998 analysis of Nyerere government’s large-scale 
compulsory villagization programme aimed at the modernization of Tanzanian agriculture). 
Developmentalism was sustained by specific representations of development’s ‘beneficiaries’ 
as ‘backward’, ‘traditional’, ‘conservative’ and ‘lazy’ (Schneider, 2006). Due to these 
undesirable attributes, development’s beneficiaries were viewed as producers of their own 
poverty and disease (Marsland, 2006). Such representations facilitated not only the 
administration and financing of top-down modernization programmes (often supported by 
international development aid in postcolonial times), but also fostered a mistrust of poor 
people’s agency among state elites. As a result, state officials actively marginalized the 
agency and initiative of the poor, sustaining developmental paternalism. Overall, five features 
of late colonial and ‘socialist’ postcolonial developmentalist governance can be identified 
(Burton and Jennings, 2007): (a) state officials’ faith in modernist top-down planning; (b) 
promotion of and confidence in developmental solutions provided by Western technoscience; 
(c) paternalism of the state toward its citizens and subjects; (d) concomitant suspicion toward 
the citizens’ agency, particularly those that were uneducated and poor; (e) increasing 
economic and socio-cultural differentiation in the population.7 As we show below, most of 
                                                
6 Schneider (2006) has convincingly argued that even when local officials did not literally follow the central 
government’s orders, their own personal adherence to developmentalism guided their actions. 
7 During the colonial era, in East Africa, this differentiation was promoted by the state in the first place by granting 
preferential access to land and other resources to white settlers and through handsome remuneration packages for 
state employees (Burton and Jennings, 2007). In postcolonial times, the high salaries (and other opportunities that 
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these features, modulated by the arrival of new institutions, have been carried over to the 
present.  
In addition, roots of authoritarian and paternalistic governance by postcolonial elites are 
argued to lay in their “singular adaptation of ‘traditional’ African forms of social and political 
relations to the modern world.” (Chabal, 2009: 15). Here, paternalistic governance is said to 
be anchored in pre-colonial patrimonial ‘traditions’ in which leaders were respected as 
teachers and family heads. These leaders possessed the right to correct, dismiss and even 
punish non-elites if their initiatives were deemed inappropriate. This is certainly true for 
Nyerere in Tanzania, who was widely respected as a teacher and father (of the nation). Under 
this patrimonial governance, Nyerere often voiced and exercised his right to discipline and 
punish protesting students and peasants (Schneider, 2006; Eckert, 2011; Saul, 2012). 
Since the mid 1980s, Nyerere’s socialist developmentalism has been complemented, 
overlaid and partly displaced by neoliberalism. Advised and coerced by the World Bank and 
the IMF, the Tanzanian state has gradually withdrawn from the economy to ‘free’ the 
markets.8 Poor peasants in the neoliberal discourse have been reframed as rational agents, 
adding a new twist to the distrust and marginalization of peasants’ agency by state elites. 
Under neoliberal governance, peasants’ agency as individualized maximizing agents of 
neoclassical economics is to be promoted (Harrison, 2005; Pallotti, 2008). Yet beyond the 
promotion of peasants’ agency in this rather narrow economic sense, public and now private 
                                                                                                                                                   
can be accessed as a result of proximity to state bodies) continued not only for government employees but also for 
those employed by parastatals and quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations). 
8 Neoliberalism has ushered in privatized governance led by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Additionally, 
since the 1990s, most Tanzanian parastatals have been privatized, often with foreign direct investment promoted by 
the state (Schroeder, 2008). Foreign private corporations (including those from the historical rival South Africa) are 
now depicted by Tanzanian political elites as friends and partners in development. In terms of governance, the recent 
developmental partnerships of the state (with NGOs and corporations) have produced a new regime that is part 
public and part privatized. 
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elites have continued to pursue developmentalist, modernization-inspired strategies, while 
marginalizing and distrusting broader socio-political agency and initiative of common 
Tanzanians (for examples, see Walley, 2002, for disregard of local peoples’ knowledge by 
governmental and non-governmental officials in a marine park; Marsland, 2006, on the 
organization of a participatory community-based public health project by the Tanzanian state 
in a style not very different from the old developmental paternalism; and Schroeder, 2008, for 
South African firms’ distrust of Tanzanian farmers’ capabilities). 
In general, the style of neoliberalism that has emerged and developed in Tanzania over the 
last three decades has been shaped by developmentalist and other institutions nurtured and 
created during the late colonial and early postcolonial periods. While playing an active role in 
rolling out the neoliberal reform process, the Tanzanian state has continued to “favour the 
dirigiste model of state-society relations of the socialist era” (Pallotti, 2008: 232). Far from 
being consigned to the dustbins of history, governmental paternalism continues to flourish in 
a country where ‘all land is public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of all 
citizens’ (URT, 1993: 3.1.b, in Pallotti, 2008: 228). Even the state itself, particularly since the 
early 1990s, has not been simply weakened or rolled back but rather re-formed into a specific 
kind of a strong state that operates according to neoliberal principles. Inside its own 
organizations, the state has introduced numerous incentive-based mechanisms such as 
“results-oriented management and output-oriented budgeting” (Harrison, 2005: 1309). 
In the foregoing, we have attempted to illustrate how newer institutions of governance in 
Tanzania did not simply replace their older counterparts, but rather the old and the new, the 
formal and the informal, became entangled with each other. Such institutions included 
‘customary’ norms, shared developmentalist visions of political elites, governmental 
regulations to promote free markets and constitutional decrees that vest all land in the office 
of the country’s president. These and other historically-constituted institutions form a 
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contemporary institutional arrangement assembled during colonial and postcolonial eras under 
indirect, developmentalist, patrimonial (‘traditionalist’) and neoliberal governance. Together 
the elements of this institutional arrangement guide but do not determine the behaviour of 
different actors (including those whose agency the same arrangement attempts to 
marginalize), and the nature of their interactions with each other, in a SSI. In some 
circumstances that are deemed unjust or undesirable, these actors may, collectively and 
individually, confront, subvert, adapt, or evade institutional governance.  
In the remainder of this paper, we use the two concepts of institutional arrangement and 
organizational model to analyse how particular constellations of actors come together in the 
form of distinct organisational models as the SSI evolves. We carry out a dynamic analysis by 
comparing emerging organisational models and their institutional governance in Tanzania’s 
Jatropha biofuels SSI for three different years: 2000, 2005 and 2008/9. We also attempt to 
show how learning by firm and non-firm actors in the respective organisational models shapes 
subsequent actions and choices, once again in an intimate interplay with the institutional 
arrangement. Since the kind of reflexive learning processes that can give rise to new strategic 
decisions and re-orientation have gotten underway only recently, we are unable to give a 
comprehensive account of this learning dynamic at this point in time. The focus in the 
following is thus squarely on the unfolding processes (as opposed to definitive outcomes or 
impacts) of sectoral development observed as the emergence of different organizational 
models governed by the prevailing institutional arrangement. Thus, our analysis built on the 
two concepts we have developed above encapsulates and links up the three building blocks of 
SSI (namely, technologies, actors with their networks, and institutions). However, it also 
permits us to add historical depth to, and broaden the heterogeneity of actors and their 
networks and learning processes beyond conventional SSI analyses.  
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3. Methodology 
In two surveys in early 2005 and late 2008, we attempted to trace all significant Jatropha 
activities in Tanzania by talking to people who were knowledgeable about the fledgling 
sector: officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Minerals and the National Biofuels 
Taskforce (established in 2006), NGO representatives, academics and private entrepreneurs. 
Jatropha activities include nursery preparation, cultivation of the plant, seed pressing, and 
developing end-use applications for the oil or the residual seedcake. We used the snowball 
method to identify key informants, starting with a few known actors and identifying others 
through them. Most early activities were development projects led by local NGOs and 
governmental agencies, but there were also a few for-profit ventures run by local companies. 
All had one or more foreign connections for accessing financial support or techno-scientific 
knowledge. The first survey found 17 experimental projects and the second identified close to 
40.  
Most of the activities were visited and a few contacted by e-mail. Many early experiments 
were in the Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions in the northeast. Others were in Morogoro, Dar es 
Salaam, Kilwa, and in Tunduru in the south. Later on, activities were also found in western 
and northwestern Tanzania. Face-to-face interviews, guided by a detailed standard checklist 
of open-ended questions, were held with representatives of these Jatropha activities. Each 
interview covered the goal, history and nature of the Jatropha activities undertaken. In order 
to get a sense of the evolution of the sector, the respondents were requested to provide 
considerable details about the development trajectory of their Jatropha activities over time. 
We also inquired how these activities were embedded in larger business networks. For the 
pivotal SSI actors out of these, we investigated what the networks looked like in terms of the 
adopted organisational models, covering aspects such as strategic goal orientation (in relation 
to environmental, social and economic sustainability), organisation of cultivation and 
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processing, technology and associated learning processes, labour relations and linkages with 
other actors in the sector. We inquired about people’s expectations about future 
developments, since expectations can be an important driver of people’s actions. Considering 
the complexity of the processes and the experimental nature of the research, we focussed on 
gathering qualitative information through the interviews.  
In addition, government representatives were interviewed, predominantly for contextual 
information about Tanzania's energy bottlenecks and strategy and the government’s 
perspective on the role of biofuels. Actors located outside Tanzania (such as international 
donors, car manufacturers, seed growers and airlines) were not interviewed. 
 
4. Emergence of a Jatropha biofuels sector in Tanzania: institutional and organizational 
considerations 
In the development of Tanzania’s Jatropha biofuels sector, three different organizational 
models have appeared in succession since the year 2000. We analyse the institutional 
emergence of these organizational models, starting with the nascent situation of the sector in 
the year 2000 with the local rural development model, followed by the emergence of the 
smallholder outgrower and plantation models in 2005 and 2008/9. Over time, the 
heterogeneity of actors and their networks in the SSI thus became greater. This growth in 
actor heterogeneity, and of the size of the sector, was accompanied by increasing 
contestations and controversies about the sector’s operations as well as about its 
environmental and developmental consequences.  
 
4.1 The fledgling situation in 2000 
The emergence of the first Jatropha activities in Tanzania has to be seen against a wider 
background. Tanzania is heavily dependent on fossil fuel imports to meet its energy needs. 
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The electricity grid reaches only 11% of the total population (EWURA, 2007) and blackouts 
and power drops occur frequently. Rural electricity coverage is estimated to be no more than 
4%. Traditional sources of biomass fuel – charcoal and firewood – are becoming increasingly 
scarce and expensive as the country’s population continues to expand. 
Tanzania’s agricultural sector is dominated by vast numbers of small and marginal 
farmers who have long been adversely affected by structurally low prices of staples such as 
maize and cassava, underdeveloped infrastructure, and lack of services (Wahl et al., 2009). 
Due to their faith in developmentalist modernization, Tanzanian politicians since the colonial 
days have aimed to develop a ‘modern’ agricultural sector based on large-scale farming. 
Additionally, since the onset of IMF-induced neoliberal strategy of Structural Adjustment in 
1985, resources for agricultural research and extension work and subsidies on mineral 
fertilisers for the bulk of Tanzania’s small farmers have all but dried up.  
 
The first organizational model 
Jatropha has been grown in the country for generations as fencing and grave marking, but it 
had no recognized commercial value until 1992, when a small company with a rural 
development mission called KAKUTE started local experiments with it. KAKUTE first 
collected 200 kg of seeds in the Sengela region for research, on the basis of which it started 
helping smallholder farmers to cultivate the plant. Simple ram presses and Jatropha oil lamps 
made from instant coffee tins were introduced. Knowledge was basically accumulated 
through practical experimentation, test plots, and discussions with local women’s groups. 
KAKUTE was the first to set up a network of local collection centres in rural areas, from 
where seeds were collected periodically to be processed in the organisation’s small oil-
pressing and soap-making facilities in Arusha. Initially, KAKUTE also played a significant 
role in the establishment of other players in the fledgling SSI by freely sharing its knowledge. 
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However, after 2005, when a number of large actors arrived who had set their sights on 
supplying global markets – as opposed to fostering local markets for rural development – 
KAKUTE began to charge for its information.  
This grassroots-based organizational model is in line with a fast growing strand in the 
literature on technology and development, which studies how new technologies can enhance 
social inclusion and reduce poverty (e.g. Arond et al., 2011). Many of these studies observe 
that new technologies can address specific social needs, especially when they are developed 
through networking and collaboration with local communities (e.g. Sutz and Arocena, 2006; 
Richter, 2004; Douthwaite et al., 2001), as KAKUTE attempted to do. Elements of the 
literature also argue that even though such initiatives hold out the promise for poverty 
alleviation, some of them may eventually lead to disappointing results and create situations 
where the poor may be further subordinated (see e.g. Nygaard, 2010; Romijn et al., 2010; cf. 
Mosse, 2001; Cleaver 1999).  
 
The institutional arrangement 
In the year 2000 KAKUTE obtained its first international funding from the US-based 
McKnight Foundation to expand its Jatropha activities. Development funding of KAKUTE’s 
Jatropha activities is symptomatic of Tanzania’s heavy reliance on international aid in all 
spheres of life. Under this developmentalist cum neoliberal institutional governance, even 
private businesses (such as KAKUTE) have been able to access government and foreign 
resources for development purposes. In fact, thousands of NGOs and private social 
entrepreneurial ventures have proliferated in Tanzania since the mid-1980s. The more 
prominent of these are organizations that tap into the foreign aid stream, which have, in this 
process, honed their resource acquisition skills and nurtured their contacts with funding 
agencies. However, such a focus on the development of funding acquisition skills does not 
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directly translate into effectiveness in achieving grassroots-based development interventions 
where the poor beneficiaries’ needs and agency must be made central. Achieving such 
effectiveness becomes particularly problematic in the Tanzanian institutional context where 
the same beneficiaries’ agency has been marginalized and distrusted for decades under 
regimes of developmentalist, indirect, and patrimonial governance (as outlined in section 2).  
In this broad institutional context, KAKUTE turned out to be a highly capable player, 
riding on a wave of international popularity of Jatropha as an instrument that promised to 
deliver poverty alleviation and rural development. It dominated the small Jatropha network in 
the years following 2000. The learning processes in the sector were incipient (based on 
KAKUTE’s efforts), without involvement of specialised knowledge institutions such as 
universities and committed R&D laboratories. The government did not play a direct role in 
promoting learning, as a regulator, network actor, or financier in the sectoral system. As we 
already noted, however, the government has played an important role in the background to 
usher in neoliberal governance (of Tanzanian agriculture and international development aid) 
while sticking close to its developmentalist ideals. 
The government produced other indirect effects on Jatropha biofuels sectoral 
development. Many farmers have had disastrous experiences with earlier government-
sponsored ‘scientific agriculture’ initiatives such as that promoted in socialist Ujamaa villages 
under Nyerere. Farmers have also lost faith in experimental new crops introduced through 
government initiatives.9 The lack of trust by farmers in the government and its promises to 
uplift them, has thus accumulated over decades of negative experiences. Since the mid-1980s, 
under neoliberal developmentalist governance, the failure of many NGO-led development 
                                                
9 Recent experiences, such as that with the Moringe tree – promoted by the government a few years ago – were also 
disappointing as farmers were let down by the lack of a profitable market (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009). 
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projects has broadened the ambit of farmers’ lack of trust (that originated in government 
interventions) to include private organizations. This general lack of trust has thus influenced 
the effectiveness of interactive learning by different actors in the Jatropha biofuels SSI from 
the very beginning.  
 
4.2 The situation in 2005: A road paved with high expectations  
The growth of the Jatropha sector in Tanzania (and elsewhere) was boosted by the Kyoto 
Protocol on measures against global warming, which came into force on 16 February 2005. 
Other important pressures from the international environment included increasing awareness 
of possible oil price peaks, fast-rising energy demand from emerging Asian economies, and 
structural instability of Middle Eastern oil supplies due to geopolitical problems. Steadily 
rising prices of fossil fuels, which reached almost US$70 per barrel (Brent crude) that year, 
were an important manifestation of these emerging pressures on the sectoral system. 
Meanwhile, potential investors in biofuels had already perceived the attractiveness of vast 
areas of seemingly uncultivated land in Africa that could be exploited for biofuel cultivation 
for western markets (Mercer, 2003). Jatropha had also been singled out as a particularly 
promising crop after early publications noted its potential for regenerating degraded land and 
preventing erosion, alongside energy provision (Heller, 1996; Henning, 2004; Jones and 
Miller, 1993; Openshaw, 2000).  
 
New organizational models 
By 2005 a small Jatropha sectoral innovation system had formed in Tanzania, consisting of a 
few loosely connected experiments involving around 30 different actors. However, guided by 
neoliberal governance, the government was still not a directly involved actor in the network 
(van Eijck, 2007: 87), leaving the private sector to lead biofuel development initiatives.   
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The original key player, KAKUTE, had been joined by another core actor: Diligent 
Tanzania Ltd, a subsidiary of a small Dutch TNC, Diligent Energy Systems. The latter had 
started pursuing an informal outgrower model, collecting seeds from farmers on an irregular 
basis (for instance at weekly markets), including seeds collected from wild Jatropha plants 
already growing in Arusha region. As a next step, Diligent began to contract small farmers to 
provide seeds on a more regular basis for its prospective mechanical oil-pressing facility in 
Arusha, and initially distributed Jatropha seedlings as well. Diligent was cautious, foreseeing 
the competition between food and fuel crops: farmers were advised not to plant Jatropha as a 
substitute for food crops on arable plots, but only as hedges around their food plots and 
homesteads, where they could function as boundary markers, wind breaks, and anti-erosion 
devices.  
A new variant of the rural-development organizational model was also getting off the 
ground at this time, initiated by an NGO called TaTEDO, a well-established organisation for 
appropriate technology development with close links to the government and major 
international aid donors. TaTEDO received aid money from the German GTZ (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, now GiZ) to enter into Jatropha activities. 
Borrowing from an idea initially piloted by GTZ and other western donors in Mali (Togola, 
2008), TaTEDO set up two 'Local Multifunctional Platforms' (LMPs) in the remote Maasai 
villages of Engaruka and Leguruki. Designed to promote self-sufficiency, LMPs consist of a 
set of three basic interlinked machines placed behind one another: a small oil expeller, a 
generator set, and a maize mill. The idea is that farmers cultivate Jatropha as hedges around 
fields and/or intercropped with food crops, and that the oilseed harvest eventually substitutes 
for fossil diesel as feedstock for locally generated electricity (Wijgerse, 2007). The LMP was 
meant to stimulate activities such as maize milling, lighting, radio services and mobile phone 
charging. Given the low rural electrification rate and the high diesel and kerosene prices in the 
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country’s remote rural areas, combined with the government’s developmentalist visions for its 
millions of roaming Maasai herders to adopt a “modern” sedentary lifestyle with access to 
basic health and education facilities, the LMP held out promise as a significant engine of rural 
development. 
In subsequent years, considerable financial support for additional multi-functional 
platforms became easily available to TaTEDO, in spite of the fact that even the original 
platforms in Mali were by then rumoured to be powered mainly on fossil diesel in view of the 
extremely arduous and unrewarding work involved in harvesting and dehulling Jatropha 
seeds. The most well-known Malian project of Garalo, which was extensively supported by 
the Dutch FACT Foundation and the Danish Folke Center, reportedly only worked on 
Jatropha oil in the presence of important visitors. On these occasions, local women were paid 
from project aid money to induce them to gather seeds, railing against the original 
development aid idea of financial self-sufficiency.10  
 
The institutional arrangement: influences on sectoral development 
Institutionally, the emergence and rise of TaTEDO’s organizational model based on multi-
functional platforms has been guided by neoliberal developmentalist governance which 
nurtures NGOs in their attempts to achieve ‘pro-poor growth’.  This form of 
developmentalism is fostered from within and outside Tanzania by current fashions (e.g. for 
‘pro-poor growth’) in the international aid community led by the World Bank and the 
development visions generated by the Millenium Development Goals (women’s 
empowerment and environmental sustainability). Jatropha LMP projects aiming at local rural 
development were widely embraced as a promising concept that could provide the perfect tool 
                                                
10 Personal communication between Ywe Jan Franken of the FACT Foundation and one of the authors. 
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for realising all these variegated ambitions simultaneously (Nygaard, 2009). Thus, similar to 
KAKUTE, TaTEDO’s activities and network interactions were institutionally shaped by 
prevailing international development aid fashions, modulated by Tanzania’s mix of 
developmentalist and neoliberal governance.  
Diligent’s organizational model, organised around small-scale outgrower farmers, aligned 
well with Tanzania’s private-sector development strategy to foster investment and economic 
growth. Outgrower models were already popular with western flower and seed firms in the 
area, which had settled in the Arusha and Moshi area after Tanzania adopted a foreign 
investor-friendly development strategy in the 1980s. Diligent basically copied the same type 
of arrangement. One of its investors was also the owner/entrepreneur of a flower-growing 
firm, which shared some of its outgrower contacts with the new company.  
Diligent’s choice for an organizational model that did not require own land acquisition by 
the firm was also governed by other institutional elements. Official procedures for land 
acquisition in Tanzania are cumbersome. Particularly onerous for foreign investors is a law 
that stipulates that ‘village lands’, over which communities have customary rights, cannot be 
leased directly to them. First, such lands have to be converted to ‘general land’ which is 
directly under jurisdiction of the state. The state then leases out the ‘general land’ to the 
investors (for a maximum of 99 years). Under this updated form of indirect governance of 
land transactions (as discussed in section 2), local populations have experienced many 
unwanted land transfers to foreign parties for purposes that often entail no benefits for the 
locals. Even the complexity of the procedures, involving rural communities with their 
customary ownership of land and many levels of Tanzanian government, can lead to different 
interpretations of a situation and possible conflict (HAKI ARDHI, 2010; Kashaigili and 
Nzunda, 2010; Odgaard, 2006; Sulle and Nelson, 2009).  
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Despite avoiding direct acquisition of land, Diligent experienced severe difficulties in 
gaining farmers’ trust as a result of the prevailing institutional arrangement, with its history of 
developmentalist governance. Farmers were happy to sign a sales contract with the firm, but 
often broke it as soon as another seed buyer (such as KAKUTE) came along with a higher 
price, even though Diligent guaranteed purchases for 10 years at a fixed (albeit low) minimum 
price. This lack of trust between farming communities and firms has been a core factor in 
preventing the building of stable long term relations that are required for sustained interactive 
learning and for establishing reliable outgrower-based value chains. Diligent’s management 
attempted to overcome these trust-related institutional constraints by investing in regular 
personal visits to the farmers. However, as the firm expanded its operations, the sheer number 
and geographical spread of outgrowers made it logistically infeasible to continue these visits. 
This lack of trust is not limited to the relationships between peasants and non-state 
organizations. The Tanzanian government is not trusted by civil society elements including 
environmental NGOs (such as the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum) and journalists, 
particularly in relation to its welcoming neoliberal attitude toward large-scale biofuel 
investments (which ushered in disastrous biofuel projects after 2008, as we document below). 
The government has taken some of the criticisms (made by NGOs and journalists) on board, 
insisting that controversies about biofuels’ environmental and health effects must be resolved 
before it can commit itself to Jatropha promotion. This stance has led to two important 
interrelated elements of the Jatropha biofuels innovation system remaining unaddressed: a) 
government regulations and official product standards scripted by the Tanzanian Bureau of 
Standards, and b) stimulation of domestic demand which is necessary for ensuring that 
Tanzania’s biofuel production helps address some of its energy poverty and accessibility 
problems.  
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In the absence of official domestic blending permissions, Diligent turned to the 
exploration of foreign markets where mandatory mix targets and subsidies had made actors 
remarkably less concerned with any adverse social or environmental consequences of 
Jatropha biofuel production.11 For example, Diligent attempted to supply bio-kerosene 
feedstock to the EU aviation sector. It was initially successful in doing so, but became 
dependent on one powerful international buyer, which was subsequently hit by the EU’s 
recession in 2011-2, and broke its pledge to pay a good price for the feedstock. This turn of 
events would eventually lead to severe financial problems for Diligent in mid-2012. 
Overall, due to the lack of trust among different actors and the absence of a coordinating 
government organization and policies, individual learning processes were not being 
synthesised or shared, despite the presence of a relatively large number of actors operating in 
the sectoral innovation system. Hence, expectations about Jatropha's viability remained 
generally highly positive, leading to little reflection on any major problems that were 
encountered. This is symptomatic of wider future-positive orientation in international 
development (Edwards, 1999). TaTEDO’s case provides a perfect example of this future 
positive orientation and the utter lack of reflection about the disappointing results with its first 
two projects. The Engaruka multi-function platform never made it to the operational stage, 
and the one at Leguruki was only functioning (at times) on fossil diesel.12  Yet, TaTEDO’s 
portrayal of successful projects on its website, in brochures and in its discourse was 
apparently not questioned by its donors. Interactive learning was also constrained for other 
reasons: domestic universities had inadequate laboratory facilities for conducting substantial 
                                                
11 Most other foreign-direct investment in Tanzania’s Jatropha sector was geared toward catering to the lucrative 
European biofuel markets from the start, without having explored the domestic market.  
12 Personal communication with Sanne Heijnen and staff members of the Nelson Mandela African Institute for 
Science and Technology, who carried out field visits to these TATEDO projects in 2012. 
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engine and oil tests, which necessitated the building of foreign research linkages. However, 
these external links could not fully compensate for local interactive learning processes 
involving exploratory brainstorming and exchange of tacit knowledge, which require close 
interpersonal interactions (Johnson et al., 2002; Nightingale, 2003; Balconi et al., 2007). On 
the other hand, local learning processes that were actually initiated by organizations such as 
KAKUTE were institutionally constrained by the lack of interaction with partners from 
research establishments. For example, one of KAKUTE’s experiments with Jatropha seedcake 
for biogas production yielded poor results because of unreliable gas pressure. A cooking stove 
prototype did not function properly and there were many complaints about fumes and fears 
about their possible toxicity; all problems that could have been effectively solved through 
interactions with university scientists and engineers.  
In sum, although organizations differed about how Jatropha can be best exploited for end 
use (types of products and nature of demand), most were still optimistic about its potential in 
the absence of the sharing of emerging lessons. At the same time, many elements of the 
institutional arrangement (assembled under neoliberal, developmentalist and indirect 
governance) have shaped the direction of sectoral development. In particular, by facilitating 
and enabling certain options while constraining or foreclosing others, they conditioned the 
choices for specific organizational models with their different network interactions and for 
marketing strategies. Some of these choices also contained the ingredients for problems that 
would be encountered a few years down the line.  
 
4.3 The 2008/9 survey: explosive growth and contestations 
The high expectations generated internationally in the early years of the Jatropha sector’s 
development fostered great optimism regarding investment possibilities (Carels, 2009; 
GEXSI, 2008). This was intensified by an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report 
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expressing 90% certainty that the increase in atmospheric CO2 had been induced by human 
activity and warning that if combustion of fossil fuels was not reduced significantly within 
decades, a temperature increase of over 2 degrees Celsius would cause catastrophic climate 
change (IPCC, 2007). Between 2005 and 2008, Western countries showed great interest in 
utilising biofuels to combat climate change and enhance their energy security. The EU’s 
Directive 2003/30 had set indicative targets of 5.75% by 2010 and 10% by 2020 for biofuel 
consumption as road transport fuel. The US set a target of 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. 
According to the OECD, the annual support given by the US, EU and Canada to stimulate the 
supply and use of biofuels had risen to US$ 11 billion in 2006 and was expected to increase to 
approximately US$ 25 billion by 2015 (Hauwermeiren, 2008).  
These trends together heralded a major new phase in the sector’s development, causing an 
influx of transnational corporations into tropical countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
intent on large-scale commercial cultivation of Jatropha predominantly for Western transport 
fuel and electricity generation (e.g. ABN, 2007; Beattie, 2008; FAO, 2008; GEXSI, 2008). 
Within a few years, the investment stream began to attract considerable attention in the media. 
A CNN report estimated that more than 720,000 ha had been planted by spring 2008; this was 
expected to rise to over 21 million ha in 2014 (Whiteman, 2008). 
At the same time, in 2007-8, the world was hit by a food crisis. Food prices reached their 
highest levels since the 1970s. Many parts of the world witnessed food riots (Patel and 
McMichael, 2009). This crisis intensified the food versus fuel debate (Rathmann et al., 2009). 
A World Bank publication  argued that rising demand for biofuels in rich countries was the 
single most important reason behind increasing food prices (Mitchell, 2008, also see OECD 
2008).  
 
Organizational models 
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In Tanzania, the consequences of these global trends were clearly visible in a survey 
conducted in early 2008 that identified a range of initiatives and scales of production, varying 
from small-scale local activities to extremely large plantations exceeding 50,000 ha (Martin et 
al., 2009). In our second survey in late 2008, all these initiatives were found to be linked to 
foreign commercial investors or aid donors.  
TaTEDO’s Local Multi-function Platform (LMP) concept was expanded to 120 other 
locations through financial support from EU-based international development NGOs such as 
the Dutch HIVOS and Cordaid (Roks and van Vlimmeren, 2009). In Tanzania, several NGOs, 
Christian mission communities and private social entrepreneurial ventures started developing 
Jatropha projects for local development: good examples are, a) project led by DOSI (Dutch 
Orkonerei Social Investment) based in Arusha to make dairy products in collaboration with 
Maasai groups and, b) Kiumma’s German-funded project for generating electricity for a 
hospital and religious order in Tunduru in the south.  
As Jatropha projects for local development were growing, new projects also started 
emerging on the other side of the organisational model spectrum: large plantations were being 
established by a number of western firms, mostly from EU countries spurred by European 
subsidies and fuel-mix targets. Tanzania’s government was initially keen to attract this type of 
foreign direct investment, guided by its prevailing neoliberal developmentalist governance 
schema. The latter itself was informed by rhetoric from leading international aid organisations 
which claimed that such large-scale private sector initiatives can be significant engines of 
growth because of their ability to bring in new technology, create substantial employment 
opportunities in rural areas, and improve Tanzania’s balance of payments situation through 
import substitution of diesel oil or direct exports of feedstock.  
As discussed in the previous section, land acquisition procedures in Tanzania can be 
cumbersome particularly for large parcels suitable for plantations. As a result, most Jatropha 
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plantation projects were still in their infancy in 2008/9. Nevertheless the plans were rather 
grand. One company had plans to lease over 80,000 ha of village land for conversion to 
Jatropha monoculture, after removing existing vegetation with imported heavy duty earth-
moving machinery. In accordance with the innovation system perspective, it planned to 
collaborate with local and foreign universities to conduct interactive learning experiments 
geared toward maximizing yields using techniques such as pruning, mulching and pest 
control. It also intended to use new production technologies such as mechanical harvesting, 
never tried before with Jatropha at that stage. Many plantation projects were established in 
Tanzania's coastal zone, in view of their ambitions to meet demand in foreign markets (Martin 
et al., 2009), often involving the shipping of the raw agricultural product. In this sense, many 
Jatropha plantations were near complete copies of colonial plantation models discussed by 
Havinden and Meredith (1993).  
In the middle range of the organisational model spectrum, projects that tried to use a for-
profit decentralised outgrower model with smallholder farmers, combined with centralised oil 
pressing, were still central. Among these, Diligent continued to be a prominent player. While 
these projects were much less “invasive” than plantations (Sulle and Nelson, 2009), the 
benefits they entailed for the smallholders were also proven to be limited, largely because the 
oil market did not support remunerative seed prices. The Tanzanian government continued to 
refuse to allow fuel blending or grant VAT exemptions on Jatropha biodiesel. 
 
The institutional arrangement 
The government continued its non-role in promoting the sharing of knowledge and lessons 
among different actors in the innovation system. However, unlike the situation in 2005, by 
2008 other ‘fringe’ actors including non-governmental organizations and journalists had 
emerged as important promoters of sharing and accumulation of lessons learnt from the 
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cultivation of Jatropha as a managed agricultural crop. For many of the actors involved in the 
sectoral system, it was becoming increasingly clear that while Jatropha was able to survive on 
(semi) arid land, its seed and oil yields could only reach commercially viable levels with 
access to adequate soil-nutrients and water (Achten et al., 2007, 2008; FAO, 2008).  
Some environmental and development NGOs in Tanzania played a central role in setting 
off the debate over large-scale biofuel plantations (see for example, Land Rights Research and 
Resources Institute and Joint Oxfam Livelihood Initiative for Tanzania, 2008; WWF, 2008). 
They highlighted the fact that it is a mistake to claim there is an abundance of unused land in 
Tanzania which could be converted into biofuel plantations. According to them, most lands 
that appear unused are in fact valuable for their role in ecosystem conservation, provision of 
non-timber forest products, as places of spiritual importance and as migratory routes of 
nomadic tribes (and for grazing of their livestock). The NGOs also argued that efforts to 
allocate land for biofuel production must consider the future food needs of Tanzania’s 
growing population. In general, the NGOs adopted an oppositional stance toward biofuel 
plantation plans furthered by a neoliberal and developmentalist Tanzanian state, which had 
fast-tracked the plantation investments. This confrontation not only highlights the latest 
manifestation of the lack of trust between the state and civil society organizations, but also an 
intensification of this distrust.13 
Additionally, Tanzania’s history of authoritarian developmentalist and patrimonial 
governance (as outlined in section 2) has engendered a rather ‘subversive’ effect: an alert 
                                                
13 NGO activists have also challenged the government on other fronts not directly associated with biofuels. For 
example, the government’s latest agricultural development strategy launched in 2009 under the name of “Kilimo 
Kwanza” (Agriculture First) has drawn widespread criticism for promoting corporate interests (including those of 
large foreign investors) and its reliance on ‘modern’ agro-scientific solutions, including the use of GMOs, chemical 
pesticides and mineral fertilisers. Many fear that this will lead to dispossession and further marginalisation of small 
farmers and landless people (Qorro, 2011). 
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press that attempts to scrutinize state-sponsored plans for the country’s development.14 This 
scrutiny is also founded on many journalists’ lack of trust in the Tanzanian state. The 
relatively large size of Tanzania’s biofuel sector (composed of 38 important players in 
2008/9), hastily supported by the neoliberal government, and it controversial effects therefore 
grabbed the journalists’ attention. Several of the journalists’ reports, that were critical of the 
government’s FDI-driven plantation strategy, were picked up by leading international 
newspapers (a nice example is Beattie, 2008, in the Financial Times). Reports also surfaced 
that a 8000 ha plantation project near Dar es Salaam, led by a British firm and initiated 
without the affected villagers’ consent, was paying exploitatively low wages to its workers. 
The plantation had a long 99-year land lease. If this would be replicated in other similar 
investments, such plantations were argued to constitute a major threat to food security in 
Tanzania (Redfern, 2008). The Citizen, a Tanzanian newspaper, quoted an MP’s statement 
that a Dutch investor had acquired long leases over large parcels of fertile land directly from 
villagers in the Kilwa area, in direct contravention of the 1999 Village Land Act (Editorial, 24 
July 2008).  
Other NGO and academic actors joined the journalists in building the Tanzanian debate on 
food security and land transfers to biofuel plantation projects. In general, these actors became 
increasingly critical of the government’s continued neglect of food security issues (Godoy, 
2009; Kamata, 2009). In 2008, the World Wildlife Fund’s Tanzania chapter reported that 
adequate procedures had not been followed in arriving at decisions about the location of 
foreign-owned plantations and regarding the social and environmental consequences of these 
operations (WWF, 2009). A collaborative group of Tanzanian and UK-based academics 
                                                
14 For instance, journalists have organised themselves in JET – Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania 
(http://jettanz.com/about_us.html) 
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estimated that a total of 640,000 hectares had been allocated for biofuel plantations, while 
about 4 million hectares were requested by investors. Between 5000 and 10000 rural people 
had been affected by these state-sanctioned plantations, leading to alienation of their 
customary land rights (Sulle, 2009; Sulle and Nelson, 2009). Another multidisciplinary 
collaborative group from Tanzania's three best-known universities posed the question whether 
the loss in biodiversity and land degradation caused by the developments would not outweigh 
short-term financial gains. Thus interactive learning by range of innovation system actors was 
able to contest the government’s fast-tracked decisions to usher in plantations. The latter were 
consistent with historically-instituted developmentalist visions to modernize the country while 
displaying continued disregard for socio-ecological conditions of its rural poor citizens. 
In the active role played by academia in the Tanzanian biofuels debate, we can see that 
this community has accumulated important institutional lessons from earlier problematic 
experiences with large-scale colonial and early post-colonial farming programmes. One 
researcher from the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), writing about the dangers of 
export-oriented Jatropha FDI plantation schemes, reminds us that the root of the country’s 
food shortage problem lies in the historical “imperial expansion to the peripheries”, in which 
Tanganyika was a peasant economy whose main role was to produce colonial cash crops for 
export to Europe. This model was sustained through the use of “naked force and extra-
economic coercion”, leading to “the expropriation of surplus at no cost to the expropriator” 
(Kamata, 2009). Another UDSM article introduces the concept of ‘climate colonialism’ as a 
new version of a much older and strongly-institutionalised pattern of international relations 
(Madoffe et al., 2009).  
Thus, Tanzanian academics (and journalists) were able to connect the current 
government’s promotion of biofuel plantations with the state’s authoritarian 
developmentalism in the past. In a workshop held at the UDSM, the current government was 
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argued to be no less elitist than colonial and early post-colonial governments (Kamata, 2009). 
Just as the latter, the current government’s faith in modern and large-scale industrialised 
agriculture has guided its plans for a foreign-driven biofuel sector. Unlike the academics 
themselves, the government was argued to have failed to learn lessons from history, such as 
the historical alienation of land from small farmers by the state for facilitating large wheat 
farms and groundnut cultivation to produce oil for export to Europe (see Havinden and 
Meredith, 1993). Then as now, the government had distanced itself from meeting the food 
needs of the rural poor (Kamata, 2009). 
Biofuel controversies in Tanzania (and elsewhere) induced some reflexive learning and 
opened up space for new institutional and organizational developments, pointing to an 
initialization of the co-evolution between different elements of the sectoral innovation system. 
The growing opposition to plantations put large investors and the government under 
considerable pressure to provide better protection to local communities and vulnerable 
groups. Proposals were put forward for less-invasive organisational models, in which foreign 
investors do not obtain ownership or long-term lease rights but co-develop the land together 
with the local farmers by means of partnerships (Sulle and Nelson, 2009; Vermeulen et al., 
2009). The Government also produced draft National Biofuel Guidelines in August 2008 
(final text in Nov 2008). The government’s taskforce that prepared the Guidelines took a 
major step by formulating rules on respecting biodiversity, ensuring food security and 
preventing exploitation of villagers and their lands. Furthermore, until the Guidelines would 
be formally approved by the parliament, the cabinet and the president, all new biofuel 
investment plans involving land acquisition by foreign parties were halted. This state of 
affairs held till November 2012, when the government re-allowed plantation investments but 
imposed a land ceiling of 5000 to 10000 hectares per investor (the ceiling was different for 
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different crops). At this point, the government was also preparing extensive policy guidelines 
for biofuels, which promises to make food security concerns central (URT, 2012). 
Thus, in these recent developments one can see the early beginnings of institutional 
endogenisation in the innovation system. The historical institutional arrangement governing 
the future operation of the sector needed to be reconfigured in order to co-evolve with other 
elements of the innovation including the organizational models in operation and their 
collective learning processes. Many actors both within Tanzania and elsewhere were 
mobilizing to make this co-evolution possible, by doing research, writing reports, beginning 
to work on new regulatory institutions, organizing stakeholder forums, and striking up 
informal alliances (e.g. by supporting each other on blogsites and in the local press). The 
tangible effects of this co-evolving institutional and organizational reconfiguration, however, 
remain to be seen. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In his classic article on sectoral systems of innovation (SSI’s), Malerba (2002) called for 
analyses of the role played by institutions in these systems. According to him, “a lot of work 
needs to be done in this respect, and (...) in various directions.” (Malerba 2002: 257). In the 
ten years since, a large number of SSI studies have delved into institutional analysis using 
different theories and methods, in rich as well as in developing countries. We have attempted 
to contribute to this literature by elaborating one, hopefully fruitful, direction in which 
institutional analysis in SSI’s can be done. The approach we have developed uses middle-
range theorizing and detailed empirical analysis of the governance of actors and their 
interactions in emerging organizational models in Tanzania by a historically-constituted 
institutional arrangement. The institutional arrangement studied by us was assembled during 
late colonial and postcolonial eras of Tanzania’s history four overlapping historical 
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governance schemas (see section 2): indirect, patrimonial, developmentalist and neoliberal. 
These schemas of governance were based on current manifestations of specific institutions 
including ‘customary’ norms, shared developmental visions of political elites, faith in 
modernization which marginalized poor peoples’ needs and agency, lack of trust between 
state and non-state actors, governmental regulations to promote free markets and 
constitutional decrees that vest all land in the office of the country’s president, together 
guided the composition and development of three different organizational models that 
constitute the core of Tanzania’s Jatropha biofuels sector. 
The first organizational model was led by grassroots NGOs and other private 
organizations with a developmental mission. The stated aim of this model was often poverty 
reduction by building self-sufficient peasant communities that cultivate Jatropha for end-uses 
such as biodiesel for local electricity generation and soap-making. Governed by a mix of 
neoliberalism and developmentalism, this organizational model was characterized by a 
disconnect from its poor beneficiaries’ needs and practices, pecuniary alignment between 
funding bodies and the implementing organizations, and lack of trust between different 
organizations which led to fragmented learning processes without explicit coordination and 
interaction to synthesize results.  
The second organization model entailed contract farming arrangements involving 
thousands of smallholder outgrowers who supplied Jatropha seeds to a firm owning a 
centralized oil processing facility. The choice of this outgrower-based model, rather than one 
based on ownership of a large plantation, was governed by Tanzania’s cumbersome land 
acquisition procedures under which rural ‘village’ land cannot be directly transferred to an 
investor but has to be first converted into government-owned ‘general’ land. This dual 
ownership of land, and the procedures for its transfer, is a clear present-day manifestation of 
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indirect governance. The working of the organizational model was also characterized by the 
lack of trust between the outgrowers and the firm. 
The third type of organizational model was structured around large plantations set up by 
transnational corporations, often to ship unprocessed Jatropha seeds to the West. Many of 
these plantation investments were fast-tracked by the Tanzanian government, ostentatiously to 
generate employment opportunities for the rural poor, under the influence of neoliberal 
governance. Beyond the fast-tracking of investments, there was little involvement by the state 
to promote the development of domestic end-uses of Jatropha or to ensure that the plantations 
were not exploitative toward its workers and the local environment. For instance, there is no 
governmental monitoring of ongoing plantation schemes: once their application has been 
approved by the Tanzanian Investment Centre, they are “in”.15 Civil society groups 
(environmental/developmental NGOs, academics and journalists) in Tanzania did, however, 
highlight these problems and their parallels with plantations promoted by the colonial state for 
shipping primary commodities to Europe. Thus, in the specific case of large plantations, the 
civil society groups’ distrust of the state manifested as an open challenge to the latter’s plans 
guided by the dominant institutions of (neoliberal and developmentalist) governance. This 
confrontation triggered some reflexive learning by the state which decided to halt all 
applications for new biofuel plantations involving foreign investors until a national zoning 
plan would be officially agreed upon. It also sowed the seeds for experimentation with new 
institutions to deal with social and environmental problems engendered by the biofuel sector, 
thereby initiating a reconfiguration of the current institutional arrangement. 
                                                
15 Personal communication between a spokesperson from the Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (HAKI 
ARDHI) and the second author, August 2012. 
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Overall, our theoretical approach based on the concepts of organizational models and 
institutional arrangements has allowed us to make two contributions to the literature on 
sectoral innovation systems in development. First, it has allowed us to foreground the central 
role played by ‘fringe’ actors such as NGOs, journalists, academics and smallholder farmers 
who are generally left out of the picture in sectoral innovation system studies. Second, by 
historically grounding Tanzania’s institutions, we are able to show how specific ways of 
organizing the sector and learning processes within it are governed not only by institutions 
that are currently dominant (such as those associated with neoliberalism), but also those put in 
place in the past and updated to the present (e.g. authoritarian developmentalism, patrimonial 
‘traditions’, and indirect governance of land/labour transactions). Additionally, the older 
institutions conditioned the emergence of new ones while getting modified themselves, as 
witnessed in the mix of neoliberalism and developmentalism in Tanzania.  
The institutions we studied are products of Tanzania’s transnational history. As a result, 
the institutions and their influences on the development of the Jatropha biofuels sector are 
surely specific to Tanzania. However, neither the institutions themselves nor the guiding 
influences they yielded would have been possible without connections to actors, discourses 
and developments outside Tanzania (a prime example is the neoliberal discourse globalized 
by the World Bank and the IMF). Many of these actors and discourses may have achieved a 
‘global’ presence but their manifestation in a specific setting is shaped by local socio-political 
and ecological history. Despite these localizations, however, global actors and discourses end 
up producing many similarities across regions and countries, as amply demonstrated by the 
similar effects of biofuels in worsening food security and ecological degradation in parts of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America (Smith, 2010; Kant and Wu, 2011). An historical-institutional 
analysis of the kind we conducted in this paper affords the possibility to understand how any 
similar outcomes may be differently produced through institutional processes that are specific 
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to one country or region and rooted in local/national historical trajectories which nevertheless 
possessed non-local (international) connections. 
Using the two concepts of institutional arrangements and organizational models, we are 
able to explain the emergence of reasonably successful reflexive learning processes in 
Tanzania Jatropha biofuels sector. These processes were undergirded by institutionalized 
activities carried out by a plurality of actors, including strong environmental-developmental 
non-firm and non-governmental organizations, societally-embedded academic institutions 
with neo-Marxist roots, and a critical press with a long tradition of civic engagement. Similar 
outcomes in Jatropha biofuels sectors of other Sub-Saharan African countries, such as 
Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana or Ethiopia, are difficult to imagine. However, as we noted 
above, even if they do arise, such outcomes can only be adequately understood by studying 
specific political-economic histories of these countries as they localize (adapt) ‘global’ 
discourses of neoliberalism and developmentalism, while being driven by their pre-colonial 
and colonial institutional legacies that have been updated to the present times. 
Our work has important implications for future ‘next-generation’ cellulosic and algal 
biofuels. The promise of these new biofuels is based on the claim that they do not compete 
with food production and can be grown on marginal lands. Some strains of algae can thrive on 
wastewater or saline water, avoiding competition with food for freshwater sources (ETC 
Group, 2010). Early growth of and hype around Jatropha was based on similar claims 
regarding its ability to grow on degraded land without irrigation or fertilization. Widespread 
experience with Jatropha, in Tanzania and elsewhere, has now punctured this hype due to 
dismal seed yields from Jatropha grown on degraded lands, the insufficiently-remunerative 
work involved in cultivating and harvesting (or collecting) the seeds, and the difficulty of 
extracting at least half the oil content of the seeds. However, this puncturing of the Jatropha-
hype is rather recent. As our analysis has shown, despite many unfavourable experiences in 
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the field, much of the hype around Jatropha continued to thrive for some time (in some 
circles, Jatropha is still argued to be a promising biofuel feedstock if it meets certain 
conditions, see for example, van Eijck et al., 2012; Pandey et al., 2012). To confront these 
hypes based on an in-depth evaluation of actual experiences with feedstock such as Jatropha, 
(international) civil society organizations need to team up with scientists (and journalists) in 
different parts of the world to set up biofuel monitoring organizations. In our case, a start in 
this direction was already made by the informal coalition between Tanzanian academics, 
NGOs and journalists in their attempts to oppose the state’s fast-tracking of biofuel 
plantations. Similar monitoring work is being done by Biofuel Watch 
(http://www.biofuelwatch.org.uk/) based in the UK and the US, in cooperation with their 
international partners. Most importantly, such watchdog organizations need to be based in 
tropical countries that will provide a bulk of the feedstock for ‘next-generation’ biofuels. 
Finally, many adverse impacts of land-use change entailed in cultivating biofuels can be 
‘irreversible’. For example, a woodland that is deforested to make way for a biofuel 
plantation, aside from producing a negative carbon balance (Romijn, 2011), can take decades 
to regenerate (and only if concerted efforts are made to do so). This can endanger the 
sustenance of communities that depended on the forests for non-timber products and fuel 
wood. Even so-called degraded lands, earmarked for biofuel plantations, often serve as 
grazing grounds for cattle or carry spiritual or migratory significance for people living around 
them. In less invasive organizational models, growing a biofuel crop as a hedge may not 
directly compete for land with food crops, but if commercially interesting yields are desired, 
the biofuel hedge would still need labour and farm-inputs (including water) like any other 
crop, and thereby compete with food cultivation. Serving high-consumption markets in the 
West with hedge-produced biofuels is also likely to be impracticable due to the large 
geographical dispersion of outgrowers and western sustainability standards that are 
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unworkable in the local context (Romijn et al., 2012). Because of these problems, we believe 
that Jatropha biofuel production holds out little promise for substantial rural development in 
Tanzania. Furthermore, in order to avoid future hypes and newer adverse impacts from 
biofuel cultivation, mandatory mix targets and subsidies should be discontinued in the 
developed world as well as in large developing countries. These biofuel subsidies and targets 
should be replaced by incentives to reduce the consumption (and production) of all fuels for 
transport and electricity-generation by organizations and by individuals belonging to the 
world’s upper- and middle-classes (cf. ETC Group, 2010). Reduced consumption by the rich, 
rather than ‘greener’ production, can then become the guiding light of sustainable 
development worldwide. 
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